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Abstract 
Xunzi is well-known for his claim that “human nature is evil (e 惡)” and that the rites (li 禮) are 
established to bring order to a society. Most research on Xunzi has thus focused on how the 
transformation of human nature (hua xing qi wei 化性起偽) is possible and the role of the rites in 
the development of a moral agent. However, what has not been explored is the extent to which the 
practice of the rites contributes to a meaningful life that is comparable to some Western conceptions 
of meaningfulness. Through surveying the conception of meaningfulness given by Susan Wolf, this 
paper aims to show that the practice of the rites in the Xunzi has both objective and subjective 
values that are necessary for rendering a life meaningful. Furthermore, the practice of the rites 
resolves the tension that arises in contemporary Western discussions of meaningfulness regarding 






Albert Camus starts his Myth of Sisyphus dealing with what he thinks is the 
most urgent of all philosophical problems—suicide, for if one judges life to have 
no significance, then nothing else matters. 1  In response to this urgency, 
contemporary philosophers have come up with various approaches to address the 
issue of meaning in life, including both supernaturalism and naturalism.2 While 
supernaturalism rests the meaning of life on a supernatural being such as God, 
naturalism suggests that human beings can have a meaningful life without 
assuming the existence of any supernatural entity. The naturalist approach can be 
further divided into two main branches, subjectivism and objectivism, which are 
mainly distinguished based on the issue of whether an objective standard, rather 
than one’s subjective desires, is necessary for a life to be meaningful. During such 
discussions, there arises a tension between living a moral life and satisfying one’s 
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self-interests; as such, Susan Wolf puts forward an approach that combines both 
subjective and objective values. The quest for a meaningful life in the 
contemporary Western tradition, as suggested by Thaddeus Metz, is a quest for “a 
significant existence”—not only does this quest of meaningfulness seek the value 
of life, but the solution to this quest also suggests how people should live in this 
world, in contrast to living a happy and moral life.3 
Although early Confucians (Confucius, Mencius and Xunzi) lacked a 
systematic analysis of the conception of meaningful life, it is undeniable that 
they were concerned with how one should orient oneself in a chaotic world in 
order to live a good life. Richard Kim and Joshua W. Seachris suggest that 
Confucius’s emphasis on rituals [the rites] (li 禮) and the value of family allows 
one to live a meaningful life with purpose and significance.4 Apart from 
encouraging a sense of purpose and significance, I suggest that the practice of 
the rites and the value of family as expressed in the Xunzi also provides people 
guidance as to how one should live in this world, and it is in this sense that the 
practice of the rites contributes meaning to one’s life. Xunzi is of particular 
interest in this paper because of his views towards human nature (xing 性). On the 
one hand, he contends that human beings are born with various desires and are 
driven to satisfy their own interests, without regard for public interest. On the 
other hand, he argues that everyone is capable of becoming a moral agent living 
harmoniously in society through learning and practicing the rites. This 
seemingly contrasting view towards human nature can be viewed as representing 
the contrasting views of subjectivism and objectivism. With the help of the 
conception of meaningfulness given by Susan Wolf, this paper aims to show that 
the practice of the rites in the Xunzi may shed some light on how to reconcile the 
tensions between morality and self-interest, and allow one to live a meaningful 
life.  
 
2. Susan Wolf on “Subjective Attraction” and “Objective Attractiveness”  
 
Although the subjectivist and objectivist approaches are prominent in 
Western contemporary discussions of the meaning of (and in) life, Susan Wolf 
finds both of them inadequate. The subjectivist approach focuses on the 
satisfaction of self-interest, and claims that one’s life is meaningful provided that 
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one is pursuing what interests them; as Metz puts it, “subjectivism maintains that 
what is meaningful for a given person is a function of that toward which she (or 
her group) has (or would have) a certain pro-attitude”.5 This conception of 
meaningfulness is well represented by a picture of the passionate Sisyphus 
suggested by Richard Taylor. According to the myth of Sisyphus, Sisyphus was 
punished by God and forced to roll a boulder up to the top of a hill. When he had 
almost finished the job, the stone would roll down, and Sisyphus had to start 
rolling the boulder up from the bottom of the hill again and again, for all eternity, 
without any aim. Many would agree with Taylor that Sisyphus’s toil is a paradigm 
of an objectively meaningless life—a picture of “endless pointlessness”. 6 
Nonetheless, if this picture of Sisyphus represents the condition of human 
existence, is it possible for human beings to find subjective value in their 
existence? Taylor concludes that if Sisyphus found “inflicted on him the irrational 
desire to be doing just what he found himself doing,” then his life would be 
meaningful, despite the fact he is not going to achieve anything with objective 
value.7 Taylor dismisses the need for objective value in a meaningful life, for 
pursuing goals with objective value would result in the “Paradox of the End,” as 
illustrated by Iddo Landau:  
 
We set ourselves ends and strive to achieve them. We hope that their 
attainment will improve our condition. The closer we get to our goals, the 
happier we feel. Paradoxically, however, when we finally do achieve them 
our joy is sometimes diminished. We have a sense of insignificance and 
emptiness, and we feel that in attaining our goal we have lost the 
meaningfulness and balance we experienced while we were striving 
towards it. In some ways, it seems to us, the struggle is more gratifying than 
the achievement of the end.8 
 
Even if the goals that Sisyphus pursues have objective value, if he pursues one 
goal after another, it would be no different from his punishment as he is still 
endlessly and aimlessly pursuing different goals. If we are to find meaning in the 
life of a Sisyphus who is keen on pursuing goals, it will be in his will to pursue his 
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goals and his struggle to achieve something significant, rather than the 
significance of the goals themselves. In other words, it is his pro-attitude that 
makes his life meaningful, rather than the objective value.  
Wolf finds it indisputable that having passion, or finding fulfilment in what 
one is doing, is necessary for a life to be meaningful. It is not difficult to find 
people who do not enjoy their life and thus conclude that life is meaningless, such 
as the alienated housewives mentioned by Peter Singer in his book How Are We to 
Live?.9 Nonetheless, Wolf points out that Taylor’s view on meaningfulness would 
lead to an absurd consequence. What if someone finds passion in “counting or 
recounting the number of tiles on the bathroom floor”?10 According to Taylor’s 
conception, that person would have a meaningful life as long as they find the 
activity fulfilling; however, this does not seem to fit our common conception of 
meaningfulness. In fact, Wolf suggests that that person may be mistaken in their 
belief in what counts as meaningful.   
However, a life dedicated to pursing only objective value, and moral value in 
particular, may be undesirable as well. In her article entitled “Moral Saints,” Wolf 
argues that the life of moral saints, whether deontological or utilitarian, are 
unattractive. These people would devote themselves to categorical duties or 
maximizing happiness while neglecting their own interests. They may not be able 
to enjoy non-moral interests (such as reading and playing violin), nor could they 
develop their non-moral talents (such as athletic talents and musical talents), for 
practical reasons. Given their dominating moral characters, they would require 
themselves to be fully dedicated to their moral duties and thereby disregard any 
non-moral characters and activities. Even if they allowed themselves to enjoy 
those activities, such pursuits would only be seen as instrumental in achieving 
their moral duties. More significantly, these non-moral interests, talents and 
characters are essential components of our identity, and suppressing them may 
result in the loss of personal self.11 In sum, the life of moral saints would be 
“strangely barren”.12  
Although Wolf argues that an objective value is necessary (unlike other 
scholars such as Peter Singer, who defines objective value as something “larger 
than the self”),13 she nonetheless leaves its definition opaque. Singer argues that it 
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12 Ibid., p. 421. 
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is only through living for purposes larger than oneself that one can avoid the 
undesirable results that arise from living with only subjective value—emptiness 
and dissatisfaction. For those who live with only subjective value, the validation 
of value always comes from within oneself, so one could never know whether one 
is doing something significant. Eventually, one would come to doubt why one 
wanted to pursue any activity in the first place and find oneself trapped in a 
vicious circle. It is through participating in something with objective value that 
one can avoid begging the question and find justification for continuing to engage 
in their activities.14  
However, despite the fact that objective value could help to break the vicious 
circle, and no matter how significant one’s impact is in this world, the existence of 
human beings is still insignificant from the perspective of the universe. Sooner or 
later, the universe will be destroyed and no conscious beings will be left to 
appreciate the significance of human existence. Singer’s view thus exposes a 
problem in discussions of the meaning of life, where a life that is (ethically) 
objectively meaningful may still be objectively meaningless from the perspective 
of the universe.15  
In this respect, the opaque meaning of objective value given by Susan Wolf 
helps to solve this problem. Wolf believes it is of importance to include 
objectivity in the conception of a meaningful life as a solution for reconciling the 
discrepancy between the perspective of the universe and that of individuals. If one 
believes that one's interests are the only important things within one's life and 
strives only for one's own satisfaction, one would be devastated to learn the fact 
that the universe is indifferent to one's interests, and that there is no point in 
striving towards any achievement since we will all die one day. As it is one's 
solipsistic attitude that causes this discordance when one is confronted with the 
perspective of the universe, Wolf thus emphasises the importance of harmonising 
these perspectives. To adopt an objective value is to recognise the fact that there 
exist other perspectives beyond one's own. More importantly, these other 
perspectives are as equally important as one's own and might be “indifferent to 
whether one exists at all”.16  Through acknowledging the existence of these 
perspectives, one realises “the fact that one is not the center of the universe”,17 
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which aligns with the perspective of the universe and enables one to carry on with 
one's life. To Wolf, this facet of an objective value in the conception of 
meaningfulness means more to an individual than leaving an impact on the world. 
If we emphasise the perspective of the universe in discussing the meaning of 
life, we eventually come to the conclusion that all activities are equally 
meaningful as long as it is one’s will to pursue them, for nothing really matters to 
the universe. This subjectivist interpretation of meaningfulness is so broad that it 
would include lives that are generally regarded as meaningless, such as the lives 
of people who are passionate about doing crossword puzzles, or counting the 
number of tiles on the bathroom floor.18 Nonetheless, if we give priority to 
objective value, one’s self-interest in living a good life may be neglected. Wolf's 
conception of meaningfulness is of significance in that it allows us to live a good 
life, while at the same time reminding us of the importance of objectivity. It is the 
synthesis of both subjectivist and objectivist points of view. The implication is 
that the kinds of activities one engages in are not important unless they cultivate a 
sense of objectivity, such that people are prevented from being self-centred. As 
such, meaningful lives can involve individuals living harmoniously with others 
within a community, and activities that render lives meaningful can be those that 
cultivate the virtues necessary for a person to successfully engage in social 
relationships. With this conception of meaningfulness, I will look into the practice 
of the rites advocated by Xunzi, and show that participating in the practice of the 
rites contributes to a meaningful life. 
 
3. An Account of Meaningful Life in the Xunzi 
 
Instead of asking why human beings exist in this world, Xunzi was more 
concerned with how one ought to live in this world, a concern that aligns with the 
conception of meaningfulness from the perspective of individuals. For Xunzi, this 
question amounts to how to be a virtuous person and establish a harmonious 
society in response to the human condition. Xunzi contends that there are certain 
facts about human beings and that we must respond to them in order to flourish. 
First and foremost, human beings are social animals that must live within a 
society. Furthermore, they are born with various desires and are driven to satisfy 
them. However, if human beings are allowed to pursue their desires to satisfaction 
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without limit, neither their desires nor the society’s resources can be sustained. 
Moreover, Xunzi asserts that although human beings are born with the potential to 
learn to be moral, they are not born with incipient moral capacities and thus they 
must learn to become moral agents—human nature can be beautified. In response 
to these facts, social conventions (known as the rites) are thus established to 
ensure the proper allocation of resources and to guide human beings to become 
virtuous. It is only when a harmonious society is established and human nature is 
refined through joyous practice of the rites that human beings are able to flourish. 
The “objective attractiveness” of practicing the rites thus lies in its contribution to 
the organization of a functional, wealthy and harmonious society, as well as the 
beautification of human nature. Through the practice, one is not only attending to 
one’s own interests, but also at the same time orienting oneself to perspectives 
that are as equally important as one’s own. At the same time, its “subjective 
attraction” lies in the joy found in performing the rites. 
One way to establish a functional, wealthy and harmonious society is to 
install a hierarchical social institution through assigning proper stations to people 
according to their capacities and abilities. Xunzi asserts that all human beings, 
whether they are noble or not, are born with various desires and are driven to 
satisfy them.19 For instance, people desire food when hungry, warmth when cold, 
and rest when tired. They also desire not to be harmed, and seek out profit or 
self-interests (Knoblock, 4.9).20 Furthermore, they are distinguished from other 
animals in that they are able to form societies and utilise myriad things. 
Nonetheless, once they start to live together, they fight each other over limited 
resources, and disorder results (Knoblock, 9.16a; 10.1; 10.4; 19.1a; 23.1a). The 
rites are thus established in response to these facts about humanity and prescribe a 
hierarchical system within a society. As Xunzi notes, it is impossible for every 
person within the same society to be equal in power and influence, otherwise the 
society would not be functional. If everyone was the ruler, then there would be no 
officials to carry out their commands. By the same token, it is impossible for 
everyone to work in the same profession (Knoblock, 4.12; 9.3; 9.15; 10.4). A 
person who is fit to be a farmer may not do well as the director of the fields, and 
the same is true for other positions (Knoblock, 21.6b). It is thus of importance to 
divide people into different professions and social classes according to their 
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20 Unless otherwise stated, all citations of Xunzi are taken from Knoblock (1988).   
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abilities, age and virtues.  
This hierarchical system also defines the responsibilities of each position to 
ensure that each person performs their duties accordingly, where the lord acts as a 
lord, and farmers act as farmers (Knoblock, 4.12; 9.15). Once a social hierarchy 
has been established, resources can be allocated according to the various positions 
and emoluments. Lower officials should only use resources that are assigned to 
their positions, and they should not desire that which is not assigned to their 
positions, nor should they desire more than prescribed by their social 
status—otherwise, chaos would result and society could not prosper (Knoblock, 
10.1). In this sense, the rites also prescribe the proper objects of desire (Knoblock, 
19.1b). To summarise, through assigning proper stations to each person within a 
society and allocating resources accordingly, the rites lay down the foundation for 
a functional and affluent society. More importantly, people with different talents 
are able to flourish within this society. Through practicing the rites, one is not 
only able to satisfy their own interests, but also contribute to the moral order 
within a society that enables others to flourish.21  
Once a society is formed, human beings engage in various relations, such as 
the relations between lord and minister, parents and children, husbands and wives, 
and amongst siblings and friends. As long as a person is engaged in a human 
relation, one assumes the duties specified by that relation (Knoblock, 9.15). At the 
same time, one is required to possess certain virtues in order to perform these 
duties properly. For instance, being a minister is to serve one’s lord, which 
requires respect and loyalty; being a child is to carry out filial obligations as 
required by the parent-child relation, of which filial piety is necessary. It is 
through the practice of the rites that the virtues of respect, loyalty and filial piety 
as such are cultivated.  
Take the general principles of mourning as an example. First and foremost, 
                                                     
21 The social hierarchical system thus established is a just system, though not in the sense of the 
Rawlsian conception of justice as fairness, where everyone should be allowed to have equal 
opportunities despite the social positions they are born in. The aim of this hierarchical system is instead 
to sustain both the production of resources and the satisfaction of desires through securing a division of 
labour within a society. The inauguration of social classes is not arbitrary, but must be done using the 
capacity of righteousness (I 義), which is unique to human beings. According to Xunzi, if the classes 
are divided with the capacity of righteousness, a harmonious society can be achieved and resources can 
be utilised properly (Knoblock, 9.16a). Furthermore, as Antonio Cua (2003) points out, Xunzi is well 
aware of two different kinds of “honors”—the honor gained because of the virtues one possesses, and 
the honor gained by virtue of the social class one is born in (147–202). It is the honor gained through 
being a virtuous person that is of significance, and positions of higher officials should be held by 
virtuous persons.  
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the mourning rites define various human relationships. In the case of the extreme 
pain and grief that results from the death of one’s lord or parents, the mourning 
period is extended to three years so as to ensure enough time is given for the 
mourner to express their pain and grief. In contrast, the periods of mourning for 
other relations last no more than nine months. Through the distinction in the 
mourning period among various relations, the obligations accompanying the 
relations are thus defined (Knoblock, 19.5b, 19.9a; 19.9c; 19.10). Mourning in 
accordance with the rites is to perform one last duty to the deceased, so that one's 
respect to one’s lord or one's honour to one’s parent is expressed without 
reservation, which in turn requires the demonstration of virtues (the minister’s 
loyalty to the lord and the child’s filial piety to their parent) (Knoblock, 19.4a). 
Virtues such as loyalty, faithfulness, love and reverence are cultivated and 
expressed to the highest through the sacrifices employed in the mourning rites 
(Knoblock, 19.11). The funeral also brings together the feudal lords and 
government officials (in the case of the emperor) and distant relatives (in the case 
of an ordinary person). Given the amount of time required for the preparation of 
the funeral, even those who live far away are able to attend the funeral to show 
their loyalty and respect (Knoblock, 19.4b-c). Last but not least, since the proper 
expression of emotions in various situations is a sign that one is observing one’s 
duties as required by a particular relation, the rites also prescribe how and what 
kind of emotions one should express as required by the situation. For instance, the 
funeral rites prescribe how the deceased should be adorned to ensure the proper 
expression of emotions. If the deceased is not adorned properly, no grief can be 
expressed; this implies that one is not performing one’s duty as a child properly 
and that one is not showing respect and love towards one’s parent (Knoblock, 
19.5a). The rites are therefore important in maintaining human relations: 
practicing them not only defines various human relations and the duties that flow 
from such relations, but also cultivates virtues that are necessary for performing 
those duties and provides a proper means for people to express their emotions 
properly. In sum, through such practice, one does not only satisfy one’s 
self-interest, but also eventually becomes a virtuous person. 
Because they install social institutions and prescribe the proper expression of 
emotions through defining human relations, the rites are said to be able to beautify 
human nature. Xunzi’s assertion that human nature is evil is made in response to 
Mencius’s claim that humans are born with innate incipient moral capacities—the 
four moral sprouts. For Xunzi, human nature refers to capacities that humans are 
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born with and can be exercised without learning, such as the capacities of seeing 
and hearing, as well as the desire for profits and pleasure. Moral acts, by contrast, 
are acquired through conscious exertion (wei 偽 ). Xunzi draws an analogy 
between a warped board and human nature. Human effort such as press-framing, 
steaming and force must be applied if the warped board is to be made straight, 
which indicates the fact that the board is not straight by nature. By the same 
reasoning, since human beings must learn and practice the rites if they are to act 
morally and to bring order to a society, it can be shown that acting morally is not 
human nature (Knoblock, 23.3c).22 Thus, instead of being executed by calling 
upon the innate capacities within oneself, moral acts are performed under the 
guidance of the rites, and hence humans must exert their own effort in order to be 
moral. For instance, human beings have the desire to eat when starving, and they 
will fight others over food. Hence, deference to one’s parents would not be 
possible without learning (Knoblock, 23.1c–d). Furthermore, Xunzi has observed 
that human relations are often seen as instrumental: once individuals set up their 
own family, they may cease to observe filial obligations; once they have satisfied 
their desires, they may no longer be faithful to their friends and lords. Once their 
desires are satisfied, human beings would fail to observe their obligations as 
required by various relations and he thus concludes that their nature is ugly (bu 
mei 不美) (Knoblock, 23.6a).  
It is in the consequentialist sense that the rites are able to transform human 
desires and bring order to a society, and it is in the non-consequentialist sense that 
the practice of the rites marks the distinction between human beings and beasts 
that the rites are said to be able to beautify human nature. From a consequentialist 
point of view, humans are no longer driven by their immediate desires and social 
order can be maintained within a society. As the rites define social classes and 
allocate resources accordingly, human desires are refined in such a way that are 
appropriate to their social status, and humans are allowed to satisfy their refined 
desires through proper means prescribed in the rites. For instance, with the help of 
the noble persons, ordinary people would be able to taste fine food such as rice 
                                                     
22 For this section, my interpretation on the Chinese text is different from that of Knoblock. Part of 
Knoblock’s translation of this section is “since the nature of man is evil, it must await the government 
of the sage kings and the transformation effected by ritual and morality before everything develops 
with good order and is consistent with the good,” where “the nature of man is evil” becomes a premise 
rather than a conclusion. However, I contend that Xunzi aims to show that humans are not good by 
nature with the help of an analogy with the warped board in this section, and hence I do not follow 
Knoblock’s translation here. I still include Knoblock’s section for reference. 
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and meat and come to desire them. Furthermore, although it is a fact that human 
beings want to indulge in immediate luxury, they nonetheless also want their 
wealth to perpetuate, and thus they are willing to lead the life prescribed by the 
rites in order to obtain their new objects of desire (Knoblock, 4.9-4.11).23 As 
human beings form new desires and have them satisfied in accordance with the 
rites, they no longer fight against each other for resources, and societal chaos is 
thus prevented.  
From a non-consequentialist point of view, human nature is refined in such a 
way that they are distinguished from beasts. Despite the fact that Xunzi calls for a 
transformation of nature, for human beings to learn to become moral agents, he 
does not renounce their inborn nature. Xunzi asserts that even ancient sage kings 
were born with the same inborn nature as those of ordinary people, and hence 
human beings are not evil by virtue of their inborn nature. Nonetheless, human 
beings should not leave their inborn nature uncultivated (lou 陋); they should 
strive to render their nature complete through the practice of the rites (Knoblock, 
4.9, 19.6). This is not only for the benefit of a society, but also because such 
practice is the beauty itself that marks the distinction between humans and 
beasts. Take funeral rites as an example again. Xunzi asserts that as long as they 
have awareness (zhi 知), even animals and birds will grieve the loss of their mates. 
Since human beings are superior among those that have awareness, if they do not 
grieve as the beasts do, they do not even amount to beasts (Knoblock, 19.5a, 
19.9b). As it is the inborn nature of both human beings and beasts to have various 
emotions, what distinguishes them from each other is the proper expression of 
emotions, which can only be achieved through the practice of the rites. Through 
employing various rituals in a funeral, emotions are expressed neither in excess 
nor deficiency, but are appropriate for one’s relations with the deceased 
(Knoblock, 19.5b). Moreover, it is only through the practice of funeral rites that 
one would be able to extend one’s relationship with the deceased. If their loved 
ones die in the morning, beasts forget their relations by evening; however, 
relations among human beings continue to constitute a significant part of their 
lives even after their loved ones have departed. Through practicing the funeral 
rites, human beings are able to extend their remembrance—as well as their loyalty, 
                                                     
23 It would be another project to look into the question of how it is possible for human beings to 
transform their nature and how is it possible for the ancient kings to establish the rites in the first place. 
However, as this paper focuses on why practicing the rites could lead one to live a meaningful life, I do 
not intend to discuss this matter in this paper. For further details on this topic, see, for example, Chong 
(2008), Cua (2005), Fung (2012), Hagen (2007), Kline III and Ivanhoe (2000), and Lee (2005). 
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faithfulness, love and reverence—to the deceased and continue their relations 
(Knoblock, 19.4c, 19.11). As such, human beings are reminded of the intrinsic 
value of human relations and are willing to observe their duties even if their 
desires have been satisfied through such relations. In this sense, human nature is 
said to be beautified and is no longer ugly.  
The reason why transcending one’s animal self confers meaning to the lives 
of human beings can be explained in terms of Metz’s fundamentality theory. The 
fundamentality theory states that “a human person’s life is more meaningful, the 
more that she employs her reason and in ways that positively orient rationality 
towards fundamental conditions of human existence”,24  where “fundamental 
conditions of human existence” refers to “conditions that are largely responsible 
for many other conditions in a given domain [a living human person, human life 
as a collective, and the environment in which humans live]”.25 It is a theory of 
self-transcendence that focuses on moving beyond one’s animal self through the 
exercise of one’s rationality, such that not only are one’s decisions and volition 
rational, but also one’s conation, affection and emotions are responsive to 
reason.26 The practice of the rites is an exercise of rationality, where one refines 
one’s desires and emotions such that they are expressed as required by the 
situation (in other words, rationality is oriented to the fundamental condition in 
the domain of a living human person). At the same time, through the practice, 
people are assigned to stations that are appropriate to their talents and virtues, 
such that each person is able to perform their duties accordingly and society is 
kept wealthy and functional. As such, on top of the satisfaction of one’s own 
desires, the desires of others can also be sustained. At the same time, virtues that 
are other-regarding, such as respect, loyalty, deference, and love are cultivated 
and human relations are sustained (in other words, rationality is oriented to the 
fundamental condition in the domain of human life as a collective). Through 
maintaining a harmonious society, the practice of the rites contributes to an 
environment that enables the flourishing of all (that is, rationality is oriented to 
the fundamental condition in the domain of the environment in which humans 
live).  
If the “objective attractiveness” of practicing the rites lies in its function in 
bringing about an ordered society and distinguishing humans from beasts, the 
                                                     
24 Metz (2015), 222. 
25 Ibid., p. 226. 
26 Metz (2011), p. 495. 
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“subjective attraction” is manifested in the joy one experiences during the 
practice. It may be argued that if morality is not part of the inborn nature of human 
beings, and if the rites consist of rules and norms that assign people to different 
stations and prescribe duties (and even the expression of emotions associated with 
various human relations), it is impossible to find any “subjective attraction” in 
following such practices, for the rites are mere external sanctions. Furthermore, if 
the rites only prescribe behaviors, and if the question of whether one is 
performing the rites properly can only be judged by one’s behaviors, why does it 
matter if one is subjectively attracted to such a practice? While it is possible that 
one may simply follow the procedures without truly understanding them, the 
practice is not genuine if one does not express one’s emotions sincerely during the 
practice. At the same time, if one expresses one’s emotions without following the 
rites, one would harm oneself. It is only when one performs the rites and shows 
the appropriate emotions that the practice is authentic (Knoblock, 19.3). Being 
authentic to the practice of the rites requires one to see the beauty and intrinsic 
value of the practice, and those who are able to truly appreciate the rationale 
behind them would perform the rites without exerting themselves and truly take 
joy in the practice (Knoblock, 19.2d, 21.7d). In other words, the rites cannot be 
said to be properly performed if one is not engaged in the practice.  
 
4. Conclusion: What Can Xunzi’s Conception of Meaningfulness Contribute 
to Modern Societies? 
 
In this paper I have shown that the practice of the rites promoted by Xunzi 
could lead one to live a meaningful life in the sense of meaningfulness given by 
Susan Wolf, where both subjective and objective values are necessary for a life to 
be meaningful. I have shown that the practice of the rites has objective value. 
Through practising the rites and aiming for the establishment of a harmonious 
society, human beings are turned away from selfishness and oriented to a 
perspective that is indifferent to their self-interests. Furthermore, instead of 
leaving the objective value opaque, Xunzi’s conception of meaningfulness 
provides a clear picture of what counts as objective values—transcending one’s 
animal self and striving for the beautification of human nature. With the help of 
the rites, emotions are properly expressed and virtues are developed to maintain 
human relations. The beautification of human nature has objective value and is 
intrinsically valuable in that it marks the distinction between humans and beasts. 
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The subjective value of the practice of the rites lies in one’s engagement and 
enjoyment in the practice.  
While promoting the achievement of perfection in such performances, the 
practice of the rites also emphasises the importance of taking delight in them, and 
the practice itself is a manifestation of the completion of human nature. As such, 
another advantage of practicing the rites is that it solves the Paradox of the End. 
The major problem mentioned in the Paradox of the End is that people experience 
emptiness after achieving their goals, and would rather continue with their 
struggles. This problem arises when there is a clear distinction between means 
and ends, and that one desires only the ends. For instance, imagine that Sisyphus 
is keen on building a temple but has no interest in rolling boulders. Thus, the only 
reason for Sisyphus to keep rolling the boulder would be his interest in achieving 
his end. Seeing the act of rolling the boulder as only a means and not something 
that he desires, he would be caught in a dilemma: he should try to achieve his goal 
because it is what he wants, but at the same time he should not achieve it since he 
would lose a sense of purposefulness and significance after it is achieved.27 One 
of the solutions to the Paradox of the End is to eliminate the distinction between 
means and ends, where “the activity transcends the means/end categories”.28 The 
practice of the rites is said to be able to solve the Paradox of the End in this sense. 
One does not only enjoy the practice, but during the practice, one transcends one’s 
animal self and renders one’s nature complete.  
It may be objected that the rites are not applicable to the contemporary world. 
After all, it is not feasible to spend three years on mourning even if one loves 
one’s parents deeply. At the same time, a hierarchical society is against the 
modern spirit of justice, such as that presented by Rawls. In response to this 
objection, it is true that the rites that were written around two thousand years 
ago are not applicable to modern societies. Nonetheless, it is the principle (li 
理) that is important. As Xunzi has mentioned, the details of the rites may 
change over time in response to the changing environment, while the principle 
remains the same (Knoblock, 17.11). The principle of the rites is to establish a 
harmonious society in response to the fact that human beings are social animals 
and are driven by their immediate desires. Indeed, the human condition has not 
changed drastically for the past two thousand years. Whether in the past or 
present, human beings are still living in societies and are still driven by their 
                                                     
27 Landau (1995), p. 556-557. 
28 Ibid., p. 563. 
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desires, while resources are increasingly limited. In this respect, although the 
rules written in the rites are no longer applicable, Xunzi’s emphasis on the 
cultivation of other-regarding virtues that enable one to maintain human 
relations is still valuable and significant in modern societies, for human relations 
are unavoidable when human beings are living in a society. By all means, if 
Rawls’s principle of justice is proved to be more suitable in contemporary times, 
Xunzi would not object to it.  
Xunzi’s emphasis on human relations is thus subject to another criticism: the 
account of meaningful life found in the Xunzi focuses only on partial relations, 
which ignores the impartiality that is advocated by most modern moral 
principles, especially utilitarianism. The utilitarian may take a position similar to 
that of the Mohist. Instead of spending resources on the practice of the rites, 
which aims to maintain partial relations (lord and minister, parents and children, 
husbands and wives, and amongst siblings and friends), resources should be 
distributed in such a way that maximizes the happiness (or welfare) of a society, 
disregarding partiality. Take the modern movement of effective altruism as an 
example. Being an effective altruist is not simply to maximise happiness in this 
world, but to adopt the most effective way of doing so. For instance, instead of 
going to a distant country and helping people in need, one should probably work 
in a career that allows them to make as much money as possible; in doing so, one 
would be able to donate as much money as possible, allowing for the hiring of 
more aid workers and saving more people’s lives as a result. 29  It may be 
suggested that by participating in effective altruism, one is still able to maintain 
partial relations in order to maximize effectiveness. Nonetheless, these partial 
relations would then be seen as means only. Xunzi would argue that these partial 
relations have intrinsic value in that they enable human beings to transcend their 
animal self. For Xunzi, to engage in partial relations requires the exercise of 
rationality, which orients one’s cognition and affection to other persons, and 
hence the engagement itself is intrinsically good. To treat partial relations as 
means only is to neglect our human nature and render human beings as mere 
beasts. Furthermore, being an effective altruist also means using oneself as 
merely a means to an end, which neglects one’s self-interests.30 I contend that the 
problem of the meaning of life is a problem that must involve self-interest: an 
                                                     
29 For a detailed introduction to effective altruism, see Singer (2015). 
30 For an analysis of the meaning of life and utilitarianism as well as its criticisms, see Metz (2003).    
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interest for one to continue living.31 As Camus has put it nicely, if one judges that 
life is not worth living for oneself, there is no reason for that person to continue 
living. Even though Mother Teresa may still have a meaningful life, I would have 
no reason for me to continue living if a computer programme could do a better job 
in eradicating poverty than me. The matter of the meaning of life is thus by default 
a matter of satisfying one’s interest in continuing one’s life. 
The above discussion on effective altruism also reveals a tension between 
self-interest, morality and meaningfulness. It seems that while being moral 
would probably lead to a meaningful life, one’s self-interest would be 
considerably compromised. Nonetheless, if one focuses on the satisfaction of 
one’s self-interests, one is unlikely to live a meaningful life in the eyes of the 
others. I maintain that the practice of the rites could reconcile this tension. On 
the one hand, one’s interests are satisfied and one is able to rejoice in participating 
in partial relations by following the practice. On the other hand, one eventually 
becomes a virtuous person and contributes to the development of a harmonious 
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